The continuous-time version of Kyle's (Econometrica 53(6):1315-1336 , 1985 model of asset pricing with asymmetric information is studied, and generalized in various directions, i.e., by allowing time-varying liquidity trading, and by having weaker a priori assumptions on the model. This extension is made possible by the use of filtering theory. We derive the optimal trade for an insider and the corresponding price of the risky asset; the insider's trading intensity satisfies a deterministic integral equation, given perfect inside information.
Introduction
We take as our starting point the seminal paper of Kyle [12] , where a model of asset pricing with asymmetric information is presented. Traders submit order quantities to risk-neutral market makers, who set prices competitively by taking the opposite position to clear the market. Excluding the market makers, the model has two kinds of traders: a single risk neutral informed trader and liquidity (noise) traders. The informed trader rationally anticipates the effects of his orders on the price, i.e., she acts non-competitively or strategically. In the presence of noise traders it is impossible for the market makers to exactly invert the price and infer the informed trader's signal. Thus markets are semi-strong, but not strong form efficient.
In this model the insider makes positive profits in equilibrium by exploiting his monopoly power optimally in a dynamic context. Noise trading provides camouflage which conceals his trading from market makers. An important issue is to demonstrate that this is possible in equilibrium without destabilizing prices.
Kyle's approach is to first study a one-period auction, then extend the analysis to a model in with auctions take place sequentially, and finally letting the time between the auctions go to zero, in which case a limiting model of continuous trading is obtained. Back [2] formalize and extend the continuous-time version of the Kyle model, by i.a., the use of dynamic programming.
There is a rich literature on the one period model, as well as on discrete insider trading, e.g., Holden and Subrahmanyam [9] , Admati and Pfleiderer [1] , and others, all adding insights to this class of problems. Glosten and Milgrom [7] present a different approach, containing similar results to Kyle. Before Kyle [12] and Glosten and Milgrom [7] there is also a huge literature on insider trading in which the insider acts competitively, e.g., Grossman and Stieglitz [8] .
The approach of this article is to study the continuous-time model directly, not as a limiting model of a sequence of auctions, and use the machinery of filtering theory in continuoustime to resolve the problem, in a more general setting with time-varying noise trading. There are also other generalizations that our approach can handle in addition to the ones already mentioned: One is that we do not assume that the final price p T equals the signalṽ, but show that this is a consequence of our other model assumptions.
We are able to both find the price of the risky asset and solve the insider's problem in a direct way, leading to a deterministic integral equation for the insider's trading intensity β(t) at time t, given his information set with perfect forward information, and correlated liquidity trade.
We solve the integral equation for the trading intensity β(t) by transforming this equation to a non-linear, separable differential equation, which calls for a simple solution. We compare this to the solution of Kyle [12] (and also [2] ). In the special case of time homogeneous noise trading we recover the Kyle-solution. For time-varying noise trading we get the result that the market depth is still a constant, and the expected (ex ante) profits of the insider depends on the average volatility process.
The model
At date T there will be a public release of information that will perfectly reveal the value of an asset; cf. fair value accounting. Trading in this asset and a risk-free asset with interest rate zero is assumed to occur continuously during the interval [0, T ]. The information to be revealed at time T is represented as a signalṽ, a random variable which we interpret as the price at which the asset will trade after the release of information. This information is already possessed by a single insider at time zero. The unconditional distribution ofṽ is assumed to be normal with mean μṽ and variance σ 2 v . In addition to the insider, there are liquidity traders, and risk neutral market makers. The liquidity traders are unable to correlate their orders to the insider's signalṽ. Thus the liquidity traders have random, price-inelastic demands. All orders are market orders and the net order flow is observed by all market makers. We denote by z t the cumulative orders of liquidity traders through time t. The process z is assumed to be a Brownian motion with mean zero and variance rate σ 2 t , i.e., dz t = σ t d B t , where σ t > 0 is a deterministic continuously differentiable function on [0, T ], for a standard Brownian motion B defined on a probability space ( , P). As Kyle [12] and Back [2] we assume that B is independent ofṽ. We let x t be the cumulative orders of the informed trader, and define
as the total orders accumulated by time t. Market makers only observe the process y, so they cannot distinguish between informed and uninformed trades. Let F y t = σ (y s ; s ≤ t) be the information filtration of this process. Since the market makers are assumed to be perfectly competitive and risk neutral, they will set the price p t at time t as follows
which we will call a rational pricing rule. The market makers, the insider and the liquidity traders all know the probability distribution ofṽ. We assume that the insider's portfolio is of the form
where β ≥ 0 is some deterministic function. The expression (2.3) which we here take as an assumption, is really a result in the one-period model of [12] . 1 The function β t is called the trading intensity on the information advantage (v − p t ) of the insider.The two crucial assumptions behind this result are (i) the insider's traded quantity x(ṽ) is linear inṽ, and (ii) the insider is not allowed to condition the quantity he trades on price. Here the insider chooses quantities ("market orders") instead of demand functions ("limit orders").
Note that by (i) we exclude possible non-linear equilibria. Denote the insider's wealth by w and the investment in the risk-free asset by b. The budget constraint of the insider can best be understood by considering a discrete time model. At time t the agent submits a market order x t − x t−1 and the price changes from p t−1 to p t . The order is executed at price p t , in other words, x t − x t−1 is submitted before p t is set by the market makers. The investment in the risk-free asset changes by b t − b t−1 = −p t (x t − x t−1 ), i.e., buying stocks leads to reduced cash with exactly the same amount. Thus, the associated change in wealth is (which was pointed out by [2] )
In other words, the usual accounting identity for the wealth dynamics is of the same type as in the standard price-taking model, except for one important difference; while, in the rational expectations model, the number of stocks in the risky asset at time t is depending only on the information available at this time, so that both the processes x and p are adapted processes with respect to the same filtration, here the order x depends on information available only at time T for the market makers (and the noise traders). As a consequence we obtain the dynamic equation for the insider' wealth w t as follows
This is not well-defined as a stochastic integral in the traditional interpretation, since p t is F y t -adapted, and x t is not. Thus it needs further explanation. However, since we assume that the strategy of the insider has the form (2.3) for some deterministic continuous function β t > 0, then a natural interpretation of (2.5) is obtained by using integration by parts, as follows:
Alternatively, one might obtain (2.6) by interpreting the stochastic integral in (2.5) as a forward integral. See Russo and Vallois [15] [16] [17] for definitions and properties and Biagini and Øksendal [3] for applications of forward integrals to finance.
The insider tries to find the trading intensity β t which maximizes the expected terminal wealth
The dilemma for the insider is that an increased trading intensity at some time t will reveal more information about the value ofṽ to the market makers and hence induce a price p t closer toṽ, which in turn implies a reduced insider information advantage. The more trade by the insider, the more information is revealed to the market makers about the true price. If β = 0, only noise traders trade, and since they have no information about the true price, the market makers do not learn from this trade (by Eq. 2.2). One way to see mathematically that increasing β has the effect of releasing more information aboutṽ, is to consider the formula for the mean square error process S t (β) defined by
By the well-known Kalman-Bucy filter we have (see e.g., [4, 5, 10, 11, 13] )
Solving this equation we obtain the expression
10)
This shows that S t decreases with increasing β. In particular, we see that if β
Let us define the information filtration of the informed trader as
Thus the informed trader knowsṽ at time zero and observes y t at each time t. Obviously the filtration G t ⊃ F y t and this extension is not of a trivial type, but a significant one. For example, there is information in G t for any t ∈ [0, T ) that will only be revealed to the market makers at the future time T . The key point here is that from (2.3) the order x t depends onṽ which is not in We can now formulate the problem mathematically. The insider wants to solve
subject to the price p satisfying the rational pricing rule (2.2), for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Usually the assumption is made that lim s→T − p t = p T =ṽ a.s., but as we will show below, this is a consequence of our other model assumptions, provided that the insider trades optimally. This result seems natural, ensuring that all information available has been incorporated in the price at the time T of the public release of the information. But note that if the insider does not trade optimally then this need not hold.
Since there is a tacit understanding that the price process p is continuous in this model, this result also means that the insider must trade continuously throughout the time interval [0, T ], and we can expect that the trading intensity β must be large as t approaches T in order for this condition to be satisfied. 2 An equilibrium is a pair ( p, x) such that p satisfies (2.2), given x, and x is an optimal trading strategy solving (2.11), given p. Moreover, we require that the mean square error process S t (β) satisfies
Here S 0 (β) := S 0 := σ 2 v . This assumption will be discussed and relaxed later.
We now have the following result:
Theorem 2.1 The optimal trading intensity β t of the insider is given by
The corresponding optimal wealth of the insider is
14)
The corresponding price p t set by the market makers is
where the price sensitivity λ t is given by
The corresponding mean square error is
In particular, S T (β) = 0, which by (2.9) implies that
Properties of the equilibrium
The generalization relative to Kyle [12] included in Theorem 2.1 allows for a time varying volatility parameter in the order process of the noise traders. As a consequence, one would perhaps expect that the market liquidity function λ t would depend on time, suggested by the expression (4.39) in the next section. The result of Theorem 2.1 is that it in fact does not. The intuition for this can be explained as follows:
The trading intensity β t will typically increase as t approaches T , since the insider becomes increasingly desperate to utilize his residual information advantage. In particular, from expression (2.13) in Theorem 2.1 we see that β t /σ 2 t increases as t increases. It follows from the proof in the next section, Eqs. (4.38) and (4.39), that the price sensitivity λ t can be written
where, for general β [see (2.10)]
The quantity t 0β 2 s ds measures the the "amount" of insider trading to liquidity trading by time t. As this quantity increases over time, the amount of private information S t remaining at time t is seen, from the above expression, to decrease, where S t is the (mean square) distance betweenṽ and p t . It follows from the proof in Sect. 4 that if β is optimal, then [see (4.35)]
From this we conclude that if β is optimal, then not only does S t decrease over time, meaning that the insider's information gradually enters the price p t , but also S T = 0 and hence p T =ṽ a.s.
The function λ t is seen to depend on two effects:
(i) The quantity β t /σ 2 t increases over time, which tends to increase λ t as time t increases.
(ii) The quantity S t decreases over time, suggesting that the insider's information advantage is deteriorating, which tends to decrease λ t as t increases.
In equilibrium (i) is offset by (ii) and λ t = λ is constant over time.
Notice that the important quantities are β t /σ 2 t and β t /σ t =β t in the above arguments. The mere fact that the amount of insider trading represented by t 0 β 2 s ds is large, is no guarantee that the market price p t is close to the fundamental valueṽ, i.e., that S t is small. It could be that the amount of noise trading t 0 σ s ds is also large, in which case the insider could hide his trade, and less information about the true value would be revealed to the market makers. Similarly, we do not know that β t is monotonically increasing over time, only that β t /σ 2 t is. Notice that the equilibrium value of the price sensitivity λ can be interpreted as the square root of a ratio, where the numerator is the amount of private information, ex ante, and the denominator is the amount of liquidity trading.
From the expressions in Theorem 2.1 we notice that
s ds so β t is inversely related to λ for each t. Since the quantity 1/λ measures the market depth, the insider will naturally trade more intensely, ceteris paribus, when this quantity is large.
From the general discussion in [12] it is indicated that if the slope of the residual supply curve λ t ever decreases (i.e., if the market depth ever increases), then unbounded profits can be generated. This is inconsistent with an equilibrium, so λ t must be monotonically nondecreasing in any equilibrium. It is argued that this follows since in continuous time, the informed trader can act as a perfectly discriminating monopsonist, moving up or down the residual supply curve (i.e., the market is infinitely tight). Hence, she could exploit predictable shifts in the supply curve. From the analysis of Back [2] it is known that, more generally, this slope must be a martingale given the market makers' information. Our result that λ t is indeed a constant is, accordingly, consistent with the literature.
One would, perhaps, expect that the insider, since she knows the function σ t , may use it to further conceal her trade in that she will use a high β t at a time when σ t is large. This impression is confirmed by investigating the optimal trading intensity β appearing in expression (2.13) of Theorem 2.1.
However, when σ t is low the insider must apply a correspondingly lower trading intensity, and it turns out that the expected (ex ante) profits average out. This can be demonstrated as follows: Consider the expected wealth of the insider
an expression which follows from the results of the next section. Here the last term is the expected (ex ante) profits, which can be shown to be S 0 T 0 σ 2 t dt. 3 Thus, trading at a timevarying volatility σ t corresponds exactly, when it comes to expected profits, to trading at a constant volatility σ determined by σ 2 = 1 T T 0 σ 2 t dt, the right comparison in this regard. The explanation is that in this model both the insider and the market makers can be assumed to know the value of σ t at any time t. Accordingly the insider cannot utilize the variability in this volatility to further conceal her trades, and thus make additional profits When the amount of liquidity trading t 0 σ 2 s ds is large, we noticed above that λ is small, in which case the insider's profit is large. However, a small value of λ is, in isolation, no guarantee for a large ex ante profit of the insider, since a large value of S 0 also makes the profit of the insider large, and λ large as well.
This points in one possible direction for extending the present model. Suppose that the private information is connected to quaterly accounting data for the firm, so T stands for one quarter, and let us extend the model beyond T to 2T, 3T, . . ., etc. Let us, as in Admati and Pfleiderer [1] , imagine two types of liquidity traders, discretionary and non-discretionary. Just after each disclosure period of length T , the level of private information relative to the uninformed is at its minimum. It seems reasonable, from the above formula for the ex ante profits of the insider, that the discretionary traders, acting strategically to time their trades, should concentrate their trade to these times in order to loose less to the insider. That this kind behavior is optimal is expected from the conclusions of Admati and Pfleiderer [1] , who noticed that λ is a constant is not in accordance with empirical findings; the bid ask spread 2λ is varying over time.
We also have the following corollary:
is a constant. Then the optimal trading intensity for the insider is
The corresponding price p t set by the market makers is given by dp t = λ t dy t , (3.3) where
This result follows from Theorem 2.1 by setting σ s ≡ σ in (2.16). The results of Corollary 3.1 are in agreement with Kyle [12] and Back [2] (when we set T = 1).
Recently, a paper of related interest by Eide [6] came to our knowledge. Her work, which was done independently of ours, differs from ours in several ways: She focuses on the situation when the price processṽ t of the stock is assumed to have a specific dynamics (an Itô diffusion and a martingale with respect to an independent Brownian motion), and its current valueṽ t (notṽ T ) is known to the insider at time t for all t ∈ [0, T ]. She avoids the use of forward integrals by assuming a priori that the processes are semimartingales with respect to the relevant filtrations. Like Back she then assumes that the market makers set the price equal to p t = H (t, y t ) for some function H and that H (t, y t ) = E(ṽ T |F y t ). These assumptions put the problem of finding a corresponding equilibrium into a Markovian context, which allows her to solve the problem by using dynamic programming. In conclusion, her a priori assumptions are stronger than ours, but they enable her to solve other problems than we do. In particular, the final stock valueṽ =ṽ T need not be normally distributed in her case.
Remark 3.2
To summarize, our paper differes from the papers of Kyle [12] and Back [2] both with respect to basic assumptions and method:
(i) We do not assume that the volatility σ (t) of the noise traders is constant. Nevertheless we prove that the price sensitivity λ t is constant also in our case, if the optimal strategy is applied. (ii) We do not assume a priori that p T =ṽ a.s.
But this is proved to be the case if the optimal strategy is used. We remark that if we had made this assumption a priori, then our proof could have been simplified as follows: The last term in (4.15) would have been 0. Hence Problem 4.3 would automatically reduce to Problem 4.4. (iii) We do not assume a priori that the strategy x t is inconspicuous, i.e. that
is a Brownian motion with respect to its own filtration. However, this is proved to hold if x t is chosen optimally. 4 (iv) We do not assume a priori that there exists a function H such that
But this is proved to be the case if the insider acts optimally. (v) Finally, since we are not assuming a Markovian setup we cannot use dynamic programming (the HJB equation) to find the optimal strategy, but we use filtering theory and a perturbation argument instead.
Remark 3.3
It is interesting to note that also in our general setting the total order process y t becomes a Brownian bridge with respect to the filtration G t if the optimal insider strategy is used. To see this we proceed as follows:
By (2.13)-(2.18) we have
Thus y t is the bridge of the process z t = t 0 σ s d B s , conditioned to arrive at the terminal value
In particular, if σ t = σ is constant we get
and hence 1 σ dy t is the classical Brownian bridge, conditioned to arrive at
at time t = T .
The solution of the problem
In this section we present the proof of Theorem 2.1. It can be noted to be rather different from the corresponding development in Kyle [12] . To summarize the model mathematically, the portfolio of the noise traders has the form 1) and the portfolio of the insider is
where p t is the market price at time t set by the market makers. The total traded volume is hence
If we let F y t , t ∈ [0, T ], be the filtration generated by y s ; s ≤ t, then it is assumed that
Substituting this into (4.3) we get that the total traded volume process must satisfy the equation
The main idea of our approach is that we prove that it is possible to find a solution of (4.5) by regarding y t as the innovation processỹ t of an auxiliary linear filtering problem, where the signal process is 6) and the observation process is
The innovation process for this problem is, by definition, 8) where
is the information filtration generated byŷ. As before let F y t = σ (y s ; s ≤ t) be the information filtration of the process y. Then we have:
Proof The proof of Lemma 6.2.5 (iii) in Øksendal [14] applies without changes.
Corollary 4.2 The innovation processỹ t is a solution of the Eq. (4.5) for the total traded volume process y t .
Based on this we choose the innovation processỹ t to represent the total order process y t and we writeỹ t = y t from now on.
Note that from filtering theory we know that the process y * defined by dy * t := 1 σ t dy t is a Brownian motion with respect to the information filtration F y t . 5 As before let
be the mean square error process and define
(Note that if we had assumed that p T =ṽ a.s.
then we would get S t,T = 0 and the following proof would simplify considerably.) Then (2.7) can be written
We need to compute S (β)
We have 
We first compute E( p T p t
and hence
In particular, note that
and
We now return to problem (2.11). By (4.11) and (4.12) we see that our original problem can be formulated as the following control problem:
over all β ∈ A, where A is the set of all (deterministic) functions β : [0, T ) → R which are continuous on [0, T ).
We first study the following related problem:
We will find the optimal controlβ ∈ A for Problem 4.4 and show that the corresponding
T =ṽ a.s. t,T = S T (β) = 0 and henceβ is also optimal for Problem 4.3, because, In view of this we now proceed to solve Problem 4.4. By (2.10) we see that the map
is concave. Therefore we can use the following perturbation argument to find the maximizer for J (·): Suppose β ∈ A maximizes J (β). Choose an arbitrary function ξ ∈ A and define the real function g by
Then g is maximal at y = 0 and hence Choosing t = 0 we get and the optimal β = β * is given explicitly by This concludes the proof of Theorem 2.1.
